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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Kendall Q. Northern,
Case No,
Petitioner,
vs.
Priority No. 13

N. Eldon Barnes, et al.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions are presented for review:
I.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously hold that habeas

corpus is not available as a remedy to modify a release date
ordered by the Board of Pardons?
II.
question

Did the Court of Appeals err by refusing to address the
of whether

the

Board

of

Pardons

violated

its own

procedural and substantive rules and thereby denied Northern due
process of law?
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals1 opinion, Northern v. Barnes, is found at
179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 and is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991) which grants the Utah
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over "a judgment of the Court
of Appeals." The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on January 24,

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the
writ holding that habeas corpus is not available as a remedy in
this case to modify the release date ordered by the Board of
Pardons.
C,

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, Northern was convicted by
guilty plea of second degree murder and aggravated robbery, both
first degree felonies. Northern was sentenced to two five-to-life
sentences

at the Utah

State Prison.

Findings

of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal ("Findings of Fact") No.
1.
On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern had an initial hearing before
the Board of Pardons, which determined that Mr. Northern would be
paroled from the Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988.

Findings of

Fact No. 2.
During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received
information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr.
Northern had had a drug problem and that he had abused drugs during
the first two years of his incarceration.
On September

24, 1984, the Board

Findings of Fact No. 3.

of Pardons

considered Mr.

Northern's incarceration status, pursuant to a written request for
a reconsideration of his parole date.

Findings of Fact No. 11.

Accompanying the request was a caseworker's recommendation to
shorten Northern's term of incarceration.

The Board of Pardons

determined that Northern's parole date of May 10, 1988, should
remain intact. Findings of Fact No. 4. In March 1986 Mr. Northern
3
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1992 and an ex parte extension of time of fourteen days to file
this petition was requested and granted on February 24, 1992.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or
rules pertinent to the questions presented for review is contained
in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case originally was an appeal from the trial court's
dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or Writ of
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW.

Northern filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or
Writ of Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment on March 30, 1990,
seeking to have certain actions of the Board of Pardons declared
unlawful and to have the trial court order that he be placed on
parole.
On July 27, 1990, trial was held at which time the court heard
testimony, accepted documentary evidence and heard the arguments of
counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the matter
under advisement.

On September 26, 1990, the trial court ruled

from the bench and denied Northern's Petition.

On December 7,

1990, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Addendum B.

2

was transferred to the Duchesne County Jail.

He gained trustee

status and during the next two years worked outside of the jail.
On February 25, 1988, jail authorities learned that Northern
had possessed marijuana without incident.

This fact was reported

to the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988.

Findings of Fact No. 6.

Northern had communications with Paul Larsen of the Board of
Pardons prior to May 10, 1988, as attempts to work out the details
of an intensive supervision parole were made. Neither at that nor
at any later time was Northern's possession of a small amount of
marijuana in February 1988 raised as an allegation of misconduct
that would interfere with his parole date.

Deposition of Paul W.

Boyden, dated July 6, 1990.
In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies in
effect which governed its actions and proceedings including Rule
3.10 which, in pertinent part, read as follows:
310-1.

Policy

The release or rehearing date established by the Board of
Pardons shall remain in effect [except] upon written referral
indicating that the offender is in violation of the rules and
regulations of the Utah State Prison, Community Corrections
Centers, or laws of any local, state or federal government, or
new evidence is presented that an inmate, if released, would
present a serious risk or danger to the community.
310-2.

Procedure

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date,
information shall be provided to the Board establishing the
basis for the rescission hearing.
Upon receipt of such
information, the offender will be scheduled for a rescission
hearing. Except under extraordinary circumstances, the

4

offender will be notified of all allegations and the date of
the scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance.
Findings of Fact No. 12.
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr. Northern's
May 10, 1988, parole release date. Findings of Fact No. 13. Prior
to the May 9, 1988, rescission, Northern was not notified of any
allegations relating to the rescission nor did the Board of Pardons
hold

any

kind

of

hearing.

rescission, the Board

In the

document

detailing

the

of Pardons made the following remark:

"Continue for another psychological evaluation and complete prison
progress report."

Findings of Fact No. 13.

On Jun 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a hearing for
July 8, 1988, to review Northern's status.
15.

Findings of Fact No.

At that hearing on July 8, 1988, Northern was permitted to

address the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and
to respond to questioning from the Board. Findings of Fact No. 16.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board of Pardons affirmed the
rescission of Northern's May 10, 1988, parole release date based
upon

his

"risk

to

society"

and

the

need

for

"appropriate

punishment," and rescheduled a rehearing for May, 1990.

Findings

of Fact No. 17.
Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief during his term
of incarceration.

During the appeal from the trial court's denial

of his petition, Northern was paroled.
parole,

the

Board

required

Northern

As a new condition of
to

pay

$26,350.00

in

restitution. 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Northern currently remains
on parole.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT HABEAS CORPUS
IS NOT AVAILABLE AS A REMEDY IN THIS CASE.
When the Court of Appeals held that "habeas corpus is not
available in this case as a post-release remedy to modify the
release date ordered by the Board," it rendered a decision in
conflict with decisions of this Court and decided an important
question of state law which should be settled by this Court. Utah
R. App. P. Rule 46(b) and (d) .

Indeed, the importance of the

question is reflected by the fact that the respondents requested
transfer of the case to this Court. That request was denied by the
Court of Appeals, Northern v. Barnes, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). Because of the importance of the Court of Appeals1
action and potential impact on numerous cases beyond this case, the
Supreme Court should review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991),
this Court specifically held that "there is no question that habeas
corpus review of the Board of Pardon's action is available."
Court of Appeals1

opinion in this case sidestepped

mischaracterizing the nature of Mr. Northern's claims.

The

Foote by
Had the

Court of Appeals addressed the issues raised (as stated below), the
Court could have reached no other conclusion than that Foote
applied to this case.
Hurst

v.

Cook,

777

P.2d

1029

(Utah

1990)

provided

a

retrospective of the writ of habeas corpus, and the observation
6

that "the writ provided a judicial means for securing the liberty
of a person restrained by arbitrary or oppressive power." Hurst at
1033.

It specifically recognized the writ of habeas corpus as a

necessary tool of the judiciary so it can be "armed with process
sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch of government."
Hurst at 1033.
The Court of Appeals1 conclusion that habeas corpus is not
available to Mr. Northern, and its disregard of the violation of
the substantive and procedural due process rights of Mr. Northern
(whose parole date was wrongfully rescinded through both procedural
defects and lack of legitimate basis), is inconsistent with this
Court's opinion in Foote that:

"It is the province of the

judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of due process by an
arm

of

government

vindicated."

be

heard

Foote at 4.

and,

if

justified,

that

it be

In its designation of Northernfs due

process claims as merely a claim that he should have been credited
on parole for the additional years he served beyond his original
parole date, the Court of Appeals improperly manipulated and
characterized the claims to reach its conclusion that a writ is not
available.
Northern presented the first opportunity since Foote for
appellate review of specific Board of Pardons procedures regarding
the

interpretation

and

significance

of

its

rules

regarding

rescission of an inmate's parole date — and the extent to which an
inmate is entitled to due process, including notice and a hearing,
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in such Board action.

Foote anticipated the flushing out of such

due process requirements in future cases.
District courts around the state are taking increasingly
assertive actions toward the Board of Pardons, which continues to
claim that under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1953 as amended) its
actions are beyond judicial review.

In December 1991 the Third

District Court in Rawlinas v. Utah Board of Pardons. Case No.
910905068, ordered the Board to give Rawlings post-conviction, precommitment credit for time served.

In February 1992 the Third

District Court in Smith v. Utah Board of Pardons, Case No.
910903060, considered via a writ Smith's claim that the Board had
ignored the order of Fourth District Court Judge Boyd Parks that
Smith be given 626 days credit for post-conviction time served
prior to his commitment to prison.
Board, Judge David Young wrote:

In soundly criticizing the

"This entire area of law allows

the Board of Pardons to engage in discriminatory practices that
jeopardizes the credibility of the Board...."

A third case in a

similar view, Jensen v. the Utah Board of Parsons, case no.
920901144CV, is now pending in the Third District Court.

Whether

discriminatory practices occur at the front end of a sentence
because of the Board's unlawful practices or at the back end (in
its refusal to honor parole dates set by earlier Boards just
because its present members believe that the crime inherently
demanded a longer incarceration), appellate courts must decide the
parameters of the Board's discretion to act in these areas.

The

Court of Appeals' decision in this case is a retrenchment from this
8

Court's opinion in Foote. Certiorari should be granted to clarify
for the Court of Appeals, the Board of Pardons and other pending
litigants the jurisdictional and substantive issues raised by Mr,
Northern.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE
COURT OF APPEALS REFUSED TO DECIDE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF
DUE PROCESS WHICH WERE PROPERLY PRESENTED TO IT
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Northern asserted inter
alia;

(1) that the Board of Pardons denied him due process because

it violated its own procedural and substantive rules, (2) that the
trial court erred which it applied an unusual definition to the
term "new evidence" as used in Rule 3.10 of the Board's rules and
that, if a plain and literal meaning had been given to the term,
there was no "new evidence" to justify the Board's rescission of
Northern's parole date, and (3) that Mr. Northern was not given
notice of the evidence and reasons for the Board's rescission of
his parole date.

(A copy of the Argument portion of Mr. Northern's

brief to the Court of Appeals is included as Addendum C.)

In its

opinion the Court of Appeals addressed none of these issues, opting
instead to state that the issues were "without merit."

179 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 17. In so holding the Court of Appeals departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.
App. P. Rule 46(c).
issues of state law.

Utah R.

This Court should decide these important
Utah R. App. P. Rule 46(d).

In order to function appropriately and effectively, the Board
of Pardons is subject to certain rules and regulations which govern
9

its actions and proceedings.

In May 1988, Board of Pardons Rule

3.10, which is set out in the Statement of Facts, provided that
Board's policies and procedures regarding the setting and the
rescinding of a parole date and of the necessity of giving an
inmate notice of a rescission hearing and the opportunity to be
heard before a rescission occurs.

Findings of Fact No. 12.

Rule 3.10 was certainly adopted in recognition of the Board of
Pardons1 duty to afford due process to prisoners in determining
their sentence. Fundamental notions of fair play require that the
Board of Pardons adhere to those rules and any failure to do so was
a denial of due process.

International House v. National Labor

Relations Board, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2nd Cir. 1982); Bills v.
Henderson. 631 F.2d 1287, 1299 (6th Cir. 1980); Government of Canal
Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1970). The trial court
also recognized this proposition when it stated that "once a parole
date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the Board of
Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim of the
Board members.11

Conclusions of Law, p. 7.

The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Board of
Pardons complied with these rules.

Unfortunately, the record in

this case demonstrates that such a conclusion was erroneous and
that the Board of Pardons violated its own rules in a number of
respects.
The language of Rule 3.10 is plain and unambiguous. As such,
it should be construed according to its clear and literal language.
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); Cox Rock
10

Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah
App. 1988).
The United States Supreme Court has held that a fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

Mathews v. Eldridge,

The Utah Supreme Court recognized much

the same principle when is stated that an established principle of
due process is that a court, or in this case a governmental body
acting in place of a court, "hears before it condemns, proceeds
upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." Christiansen
v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945).

The provisions of Rule

3.10 seek to meet this due process requirement.
The obvious import of Rule 3.10 is that a hearing is to be
held before the rescinding of a parole date.

If it were not so,

there would be no need for the rule to state that "the offender
will be scheduled for a rescission hearing" because the rescission
would have previously occurred [emphasis added].
Northern was not given a hearing prior to the rescission of
his parole date. Findings of Fact No. 13. In fact, a hearing was
not held until July 8, 1988 —

over two months after Northern's

parole date had been rescinded.

Common sense requires that the

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner be provided before any deprivation of rights occurs.

The

Board of Pardons cannot hold a hearing some two months after the
deprivation of a right has taken place and then claim that it has

11

afforded Northern the due process to which he was entitled when
having the length of his sentence determined.
The trial court seems to have held that the failure to hold a
rescission hearing was proper because extraordinary circumstances
existed which justified the rescission of Northern's parole date
without providing prior notice to Northern. Conclusions of Law, p.
9,

Assuming, arguendo, that such extraordinary circumstances

existed, these circumstances only excused the requirement that
Northern be "notified of all allegations and the date of the
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance." A plain reading
of the rule reveals that the extraordinary circumstances exception
has no application to the requirement that a rescission hearing be
held prior to the rescinding of a parole date. Thus, Northern was
entitled to, but did not receive, a rescission hearing prior to
having his May 10, 1988 parole date rescinded.
The procedures of Rule 3.10 further required that the Board of
Pardons notify Northern of the allegations against him at least
seven days in advance of the rescission hearing. Northern was not
informed of any of the allegations against him prior to the July
1988 hearing, and at that hearing he was not notified of any
allegations.
Each of these violations of Rule 3.10 by the Board of Pardons
denied Northern his right to due process. International House, 676
F.2d at 912; Bills, 631 F.2d at 1299, Government of Canal Zone, 427
F.2d at 347. The record shows that the Board of Pardons condemned
before

it

heard

and

inquired
12

only

after

passing

judgment.

Christiansen, 163 P.2d at 316.

There can be little doubt that

Northern's parole was indeed taken away at "the whim of the Board
members" who, only after the fact, sought to justify and legitimize
their actions.
The trial court defined "new evidence" as found in Rule 3.10-1
as any information about Northern not available to the Board in
July 1981. Consequently, the six year presence of Northern within
the prison system was new evidence; his omission after the initial
Board of Pardons hearing to reaffirm or reacknowledge his remorse
and regret about his crimes was new evidence; and the difficulty of
the Board of Pardons in creating an intensive parole program for
Northern, who was to be paroled to his home state of Arizona, was
new evidence.

This definition is error.

The plain and literal

meaning of the term "new evidence" in Rule 3.10 is evidence which
was previously concealed from the Board of Pardons or specific,
affirmative acts that occurred or became known subsequent to an
inmate's last review or consideration by the Board of Pardons.
Because all else was known by the Board members or its agents,
under this definition, the only new evidence the Board of Pardons
had upon which to base its rescission of Northern's parole was a
recent Psychological Evaluation —

a report which specifically

stated that it was to be viewed as a favorable report.
The most fundamental principle of due process is notice. The
only notice ever given Northern concerning the basis for rescission
of his parole date was that he was a risk to society and needed to
be appropriately punished for his crime. Due process required that
13

Northern be given notice of the reasons for the Board of Pardons1
decision and the evidence it relied on in reaching that decision.
Thus, the trial court erred in finding only that there was some
basis upon which the Board

of Pardons could have rescinded

Northernfs parole rather than determining the actual grounds upon
which the Board of Pardons rescinded Northern's parole.
By refusing to address these important and properly raised
issues of due process, the Court of Appeals deviated from the usual
course of judicial proceedings.

These issues will arise in other

cases and should be addressed by this Court.
DATED this J ^ T d a y of March, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

Jo/^Carol Nesset-Sale
:orney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

? ' S a y of March, 1992, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals was mailed, postage prepaid, to David
Thompson, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 6100 South 300 East,
Suite 403, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107.
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ADDENDUM A

Northern v. Barnes

CODE • co

179 Utah , idv. Reo. IS
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, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (Utah Supreme Court
held that opening an unoccupied vehicle's door to
inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable search
under Utah Constitution).
3. See Thompson, 712 F.2d at 1361. Although in
similar cases we have remanded for more detailed
findings, see, e.g.. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,
771 (Utah App. 1990), in this case the record at the
suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed to allow
us to determine whether or not the State has met its
burden. See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 (1991);
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App.
1990).
4. The Castners also allege that they were illegally
detained. The trial court made no finding as to
whether the Castners were illegally detained after
Gustin issued the citation. The court did not address
this issue because the Castners did not raise it
below. We will not consider an argument on appeal
unless it was raised at the trial court. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App.) cert, denied,
800 P.2d 1105 (1990). Thus, we decline to address
this issue.
5. We note, that on appeal, the Castners challenge
the search of the pouch found m the back seat, and
the pouch taken from Bonnie Castner's purse.
However, the Castners have waived their right to
challenge the evidence found in the purse since this
issue was not raised below. See Marshall, 791 P.2d
at 886; State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah
App. 1990).

Cue as

179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15
IN THE
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
Kendall Q. NORTHERN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
N. Eldon BARNES, Warden, Utah State
Prison and the Department of Corrections
through the Board of Pardons,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 900566-CA
FILED: January 24, 1992
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
ATTORNEYS:
Jo Carol Nesset-SaJe, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and
Kirk M. Torgensen, Salt Lake City, for
Appellees
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Garff.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas
corpus following a decision of the Board of
Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original
parole date. Northern appealed the N trial
court's decision, but was subsequently paroled
during the pendency of this appeal. We
affirm.
FACTS
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old
drifter, pleaded guilty to second degree murder
and aggravated robbery for his participation in
the shooting death of a cab driver earlier that
same year. Northern was sentenced to two fiveto-iife sentences at the Utah State Prison. He
later admitted he was under the influence of
LSD at the time of the shootmg, and had been
deeply involved in drugs.
After Northern had been imprisoned for a
year, the Board met and granted him a May
10, 1988 parole date. The Board reconsidered
Northern's status in 1984, and determined
that the 1988 parole date would remain intact
despite evidence that Northern had used drugs
at the prison during his incarceration.
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the
Duchesne County Jail where he attained
trustee status. Over the next two years, Northern was allowed to work unsupervised
outside the jail. In early 1988, with only a few
months remaining before his projected parole,
jail authorities discovered that Northern was
again using drugs. This information was reported to the prison and received by the Board
before his parole date.
Two months before his parole date, a psychological assessment of Northern was made
at the request of the Board. The report indicated that Northern had been a heavy drug
user, and had been unable to deal with life's
stresses without drugs. The report also said
Northern acknowledged that his drug dependence was a major factor contributing to his
antisocial behavior. Before the report was
published, the Board also attempted to obtain
Northern's consent to additional terms of
release that would have included drug testing.
On the advice of his father, however, Northern refused to consent to the new conditions.
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded Northern's May 10 parole date, pending further
review, and ordered another psychological
evaluation. The need for another psychological
evaluation and complete prison progress report
was listed in the written notice by the Board as
the ground for rescinding Northern's original
parole date. The supplemental assessment
focused on potential problems affecting Northern's adjustment into society posed b> his
relationship with his father. A full rescission
hearing was then scheduled for July 8, 1988.1

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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At that hearing, the Board determined that whether Northern's extended parole status was
Northern continued to be a risk to society, a collateral legal consequence of alleged due
and refused to grant him parole at that time. process violations. In Jones v. Cunningham,
The Board scheduled a rehearing for May 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377 (1963),
1990, and Northern was returned to the Duc- the United States Supreme Court held that
hesne County Jail. Two months later, release on parole does not render a petition
however, he escaped and fled to Canada. The for habeas corpus moot because parole
Board then rescinded the rehearing scheduled "imposes conditions which significantly
for May 1990. Northern was captured and confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom."
returned to prison on October 6,1989.
Since parole imposes conditions of confineNorthern petitioned for extraordinary relief ment and Northern's parole status past May
and habeas corpus under Rule 65B(b)(2) and 1991 is a consequence of rescinding his orig(4), and (0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce- inal parole date, we proceed to address his
dure.2 The petition prayed for (1) declaratory claim for credit against his parole period for
relief as to the unlawfulness of* Northern's time served while incarcerated after his origconfinement since May 10, 1988, (2) a demand inal parole date.
for his immediate release, and (3) damages in
In prior cases, discretion to give credit for
excess of $10,000 for "breach of contract" on time served was determined to lie solely with
the ground that a parole date created a legally the Board. In State v. Schreudcr, 712 P.2d
binding agreement on the State. After a 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the reason given for
hearing, the trial court denied the petition, rejecting a similar argument demanding credit
and Northern filed a notice of appeal. The for time served was the Board's discretion to
Board subsequently set a July 1991 parole determine the period of time to be served.
date, and required restitution of $26,350 by Likewise, in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207,
Northern as a condition of parole. Northern 208-09 (Utah App. 1988), we held that Utah
agreed to the new conditions, and was paroled courts have no authority to grant credit for
on July 9, 1991, while this appeal was I time served prior to conviction since the power
pending.
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested
exclusively with the Board under Utah Code
ANALYSIS
Ann. §77-27-5(3) (1990).
In general, the purpose of extraordinary
Northern suggests that the Board's exercise
relief under Rule 65B is to test the lawfulness of this discretionary authority is now subject
of imprisonment, and the propriety of any to judicial review under the recent case of Foote
related proceedings, by forcing a judicial v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d
hearing. See Ziegler v. Miliken, 583 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). We disagree. In Foote, a
1175, 1176 (Utah 1978). Northern presents no prisoner sought an extraordinary writ, conteauthority, however, for extending the purposes nding "that the manner in which his parole
of extraordinary writs as a procedure to bring hearings have been conducted [had] deprived
contract claims. We also conclude that the him of procedural due process." Id. The Utah
demand for Northern's immediate parole is Supreme Court held that, under the Utah
moot because parole was granted subsequent Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due
to the filing of this appeal. Spain v. Stewart, process in proceedings before the Board. Id. at
639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).* We are ther- 735. The supreme court then referred the case
efore left only with Northern's prayer for to a trial court to ascertain factually "the
declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of his procedures followed by the board" and to
"confinement."
decide what is procedurally required in "the
Inasmuch as Northern is no longer incarc- conduct of the parole hearings." Id. Since
erated, we must consider whether his request Northern was afforded full procedural due
for declaratory relief is also moot. Courts process by the July 8, 1988 hearing, any of the
have reviewed habeas corpus petitions that alleged procedural deficiencies in rescinding
would have been otherwise rendered moot by his original parole date were remedied before
the release of a prisoner when the prisoner this petition was filed. Northern's claim
suffers "collateral legal consequences" from a relates, therefore, not to the procedural due
conviction, such as "the use of the conviction process issues outlined in Foote, but to the
to impeach the petitioner's character or as a reasonableness of the Board's decision in not
factor in determining a sentence in a future granting Northern credit for the time served
trial, as well as petitioner's inability to vote, beyond his original parole date.
engage in certain businesses, or serve on a
Termination of Northern's sentence is trijury." Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah
ggered by "completion of three years on
1981).
parole outside of confinement and without
Northern argues that he would have comp- violation ... unless the person is earlier termleted his parole in May 1991, if the Board had inated by the Board of Pardons." Utah Code
not violated his due process rights in rescin- Ann. §76-3-202(l)(1990). "Any time spent
ding his original parole date. Thus, the request in confinement awaiting a hearing ... concerfor declaratory relief becomes a question of ning revocation of parole constitutes service of
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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sentence" rather than time on parole. Section
76-3-202(3Kc). Since the Board has discretion to parole or discharge an inmate at any
time, see section 76-3-202(5), it could have
given Northern a parole period of less than
three years and thereby credited him for the
time served while incarcerated beyond his
original parole date. We deem the Board's
decision to not give Northern an earlier release
date an exercise of its discretion.
The Board's right to rely on any factors
known in May 1988, or later adduced at the
July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be afforded such factors in deciding whether Northern posed a societal risk, as well as whether
an order of restitution was appropriate, are all
matters within the discretion of the Board.
They are precisely the kinds of issues that are
not subject to judicial review under section 7727-5(3). Accordingly, we hold that habeas
corpus is not available in this case as a post
release remedy to modify the release date
ordered by the Board.
We have reviewed the remaining issues
raised on appeal and deem them to be without
merit. See State v. Carter, 116 P.2d 886, 888
(Utah 1989)(it is within our discretion to
"analyze and address in writing each and every
argument, issue, or claim raised").
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of the writ is affirmed.
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PER CURIAM:

This appeal is before the court on appellee's
motion for summary affirmance and on appRussell W. Bench, Presiding Judge
ellant's motion for summary reversal and
motion for declaratory judgment. Estes
I CONCUR:
appeals an order dismissing his petition for
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
On August 6, 1991, Estes filed a petition
Judith M. Billings, Judge
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Sixth
Judicial District Court of Sanpete County.
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as Estes named the acting warden of the Central
policy, that *{a)n offender shall be notified at least Utah Correctional Facility as the sole defenseven calendar days in advance of a hearing, except dant. He contended that he was unlawfully
in extraordinary circumstances, and shall be specif- incarcerated because the board of pardons had
ically advised as to the purpose of the hearing. * See allegedly violated the due process protections
Utah Admin. R. 655-202 (1991).
2. Rule 65B was completely reorganized after Nor- guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, based
thern's petition was filed. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B upon the recent Utah Supreme Court case of
(amended effective September 1, 1991) and advisory Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991).
committee note.
3. Although moot questions are generally not consAppellee Van Der Veur's only connection to
idered on appeal due to the judicial policy against the petition is that he is the acting warden of
advisory opinions, courts have reached the merits of the Central Utah Correctional Facility, and as
an issue that is technically moot, but is "of wide warden, Van Der Veur has management
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur control over the inmates housed in that faciin a similar manner, and, because of the brief time
any one person is affected, would otherwise likely lity. On August 15, 1991, appellee's counsel,
escape judicial review ....* Wickham v. Fisher, 629 the Utah Attorney General's office, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition under Rule
P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981).
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted. Appellee contended that the petition
was improperly directed to him because it
contained no allegation that appellee personally had violated appellant's constitutional
rights. In response, appellant argued that the
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

KENDALL Q. NORTHERN,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
vs
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, UTAH
STATE PRISON AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS THROUGH THE
BOARD OF PARDONS,
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AND
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AND
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Defendants and Respondents.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court for
trial on July 27, 1990, the plaintiff/petitioner KENDALL Q.
NORTHERN being present in person and being represented by
counsel, JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE, the defendants/respondents being
represented by counsel, C. DANE NOLAN, Assistant Attorney
General, the Court having heard testimony and accepted
documentary evidence, the Court having heard the arguments of
counsel, the Court having reviewed the entire case file and being

fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Prison.

Mr, Northern is presently incarcerated at the Utah State
On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, he was convicted of

Criminal Homicide-Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree
felony, and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and
sentenced to two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State Prison.
2.

On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern attended a hearing before

the Utah Board of Pardons. After the hearing the Board of
Pardons determined that Mr. Northern should be paroled from the
Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988.
3.

During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received

information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr.
Northern had had a serious drug problem and that he had abused
drugs heavily during the first two years of his incarceration.
This information was new information in that it was not available
l<>

I lu:

4.

lit in i d
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On September 24, 1984 the Board of Pardons considered

Mr. Northern's incarceration status, including a caseworker's
recommendation to shorten his term of incarceration, and
determined that he should not be released on parole prior to the
scheduled parole date of May 10, 1988.
5.

In March 1986 Mr. Northern was transferred to the
2

Duchesne County Jail.

He gained trustee status quickly and

during the next two years worked outside of the jail.

Frequently

this was unsupervised work including substantial periods of time
when he labored on the farm of the elderly mother of Mr. Ralph
Stansfield.
station.
6.

At another location he helped construct a fire

During these periods he never attempted to escape.
Also, on February 25, 1988 Mr. Northern was discovered

using marijuana by jail authorities.

This fact was reported to

the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988. This information was new
information in that it was not available to the Board of Pardons
on July 8, 1981.
7.

On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested

that the Utah State Prison perform a Psychological Assessment
upon Mr. Northern and supply that information to the Board of
Pardons•
8.

On May 5, 1988 the Board of Pardons received a

Psychological Evaluation performed by Dr. Al Carlisle, Chief
Clinical Psychologist at the Utah State prison, and his assistant
Dr. E. Ted Branthurst.

The evaluation indicated that at age 16

Mr. Northern had left home to wander the western states and
became deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. It
noted that Mr. Northern admitted that he was high on LSD at the
3

time he committed his crime and that he had used LSD, cocaine,
amphetamines, and marijuana.

The report also stated that Mr.

Northern viewed his drug dependency as a major factor in his
anti-social behavior*

The report indicated that Northern's major

problem was his inability to deal with life's stresses without
the use of illegal substances.
9.

In Northern's favor the psychologists noted that while

at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne County Jail, Northern
maintained an excellent volunteer and work record, had an I.Q. in
the superior range, and had completed his Associate of Arts in
Business and three technical training courses offered by the Utah
State Prison.

The evaluation also noted that Northern had shown

growth and maturing since his evaluation in 1984 and did not
appear to have the capacity for violent acting out. The
psychologists closed the report with a statement that "for
purposes of the Board of Pardons determinations, this report is
to be regarded as a favorable one."
10-

This information contained in the May 5, 1988

Pnyrholoqical Evaluation was new information in that it was not
available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981.
11.

During his 1984 written request for redetermination to

the Board of Pardons Mr. Northern did not express any remorse
about the crimes he had committed or the victims of his crimes.
4

12.

In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies

in effect which governed its actions and proceedings*

In May

1988 Board of Pardons Rule 3.10, in pertinent part, read as
follows:
310-1. Policy
The release or rehearing date established by the
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect upon written
referral indicating that the offender is in violation
of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison,
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local,
state or federal government, or new evidence is
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a
serious risk or danger to the community.
310-2.

Procedure

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing
date, information shall be provided to the Board
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing.
Upon receipt of such information, the offender will be
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be
notified of all allegations and the date of the
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance.
13.

On May 9, 1988 the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr.

Northern's May 10, 1988 parole release date.

Prior to that

rescission Northern was not notified of any allegations relating
to the rescission and no hearing occurred prior to the Board's
action on May 9, 1988.

In the document detailing the rescission

the Board made the following remark:

"Continue for another

psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report".
14.

The second psychological report was prepared on May 11,
5

1988, by Dr. Carlisle and his psychology intern, Gail Caldwell.
It considered the issue of how Mr. Northern's relationship with
his father might affect his success on parole and concluded that
while the demanding nature of his parents, especially his father,
might create stress for Northern, his goal was to depend on them
for emotional support for only a short time after being paroled.
The report recommended that Northern be paroled to Arizona so he
could be close to his parents, who were anxious and willing to
help him adjust to life outside of prison.
15.

On June 23,

1988,

the Board of Pardons scheduled a

hearing for July 8, 1988 to review Mr. Northern's status. Mr.
Northern received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988.
16.
hearing.

On July 8, 1988, the Board of Pardons conducted the
At that hearing Mr. Northern was permitted to address

the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to
respond to questioning from the Board.
17-

At the conclusion of the hearing the Board of Pardons

affirmed the rescission of M r . Northern's May 10, 1988 parole
release date based upon his "risk to society" and the need for
"appropriate punishment", and rescheduled a rehearing for May,
1r) o n
18.

On October 9, 1988, Mr. Northern escaped from the

Duchesne County Jail.

On October 2 4 , 1988, the Board of Pardons,

6

because of Mr- Northern's escape, rescinded Mr- Northern's May
1990 scheduled rehearing.
19-

Subsequently Mr- Northern was captured and returned to

the Utah State Prison.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Board of Pardons, in working within the indeterminate
sentencing scheme of the State of Utah, has the power to consider
the sentence imposed upon each criminal offender under its
-jurisdiction and make that offender's sentence determinate.
The Courts should not interfere or review particular Board
of Pardons decisions lightly and should not reverse or set aside
such decisions unless the Board of Pardons has clearly violated a
constitutional right of the offender.
It is well established that an offender has no right to be
given a parole date by the Board of Pardons-

However, once a

parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim
of the Board members.
The question presented by this case is whether there is a
reasonable basis supporting the Board of Pardons' decision to
rescind Mr- Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date.

Board Rule 3.10

(text set forth above) provides the framework for answering this
7

question.

It states that the Board of Pardons may rescind an

offender's parole date if the Board receives a written referral
indicating that an offender has violated correctional institution
rules or the laws of any local, state, or federal government, or
new evidence is presented which shows that the offender, if
released, would present a serious risk or danger to the
community.
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons had received no written
referral from any source which suggested that Mr. Northern had
violated institutional rules.
inapplicable.

Thus, that portion of Rule 3,10 is

Additionally, the grant of parole had not been

rescinded upon its own terms because of any violation of
institutional rules.
Under the second alternative under Rule 3.10, this Court
defines "new evidence1' as negative information received by the
Board of Pardons between the time that a parole release date is
set and the time that a rescission determination is made.

In

this case those dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. This
Court defines "risk or danger to the community" to include the
situation where a person is likely to commit a crime.
After a careful analysis of the entire record in this case
and kooping in mind that this Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Board of Pardons, this Court's ruling is

8

that there was "new evidence" received by the Board of Pardons
which justified the Board's decision to rescind Mr. Northern's
May 10, 1988 parole date. There was evidence regarding Mr.
Northern's drug use at the Utah State Prison and drug use at the
Duchesne County Jail.

Such drug use was illegal. There was also

evidence which showed that Mr. Northern failed to show any
remorse for his victim or regarding the crimes he had committed
and that his behavior was, to some extent, anti-social.

This new

evidence indicated thatr if releasedr Mr. Northern would present
a serious risk

or danger to the community.

Also, the circumstances relating to Mr. Northern on May 9,
1990, constituted extraordinary circiunstances under Rule 3.10
which justified the rescission of th^ parole date without
providing prior notice to Mr. Northern.
Additionally, a review of the entire record leads the Court
to Conclude that the Board of Pardons did not rescind Mr.
Northern's parole release date because it believed he deserved to
be incarcerated for a longer period of time because of the nature
of his crime.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
For the reasons set forth above, the Board of Pardons did
not violate Mr. Northern's constitutional rights.
9

The petition

for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefor^, denied with prejudice,
DATED THIS

j_ DAY OF DECEMBER, /990.

rUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

A
-T
- T-E S T

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
By
JC^CAROL NESSET-SALE

Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner
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ADDENDUM C

Further, because petitioner's constitutional rights have not been
violated, his parole period should not be reduced.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER WAS PAROLED ON JULY 9, 1991,
THEREFORE, THE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL ARE
RENDERED MOOT.
Petitioner requests that this Court order his immediate
parole subject to reasonable terms and conditions (Brief of
Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 29).

He also asks for other

relief that the court may determine to be appropriate under law
and equity (Br. of App. at 29).

Because petitioner was paroled

on July 9, 1991, he has received his requested relief.
result, the issues before this Court are moot.

As a

In the event the

court elects to proceed with this matter, however, appellees have
briefed the issues in full.
POINT II
BECAUSE MAKING A CORRECTNESS DETERMINATION ON
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
NECESSARILY INCORPORATES A REVIEW OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S RESOLUTION OF FACTUAL
QUESTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD
BE GIVEN SOME DEFERENCE.
This case is unusual in that this Court is dealing with
two levels of review i.e., the trial court's review of the Board
of Pardons' action and this Court's review of the trial court's
conclusion based on that review.

The issue before the trial

court on July 27, 1990, at the hearing on petitioner's petition
for writ of habeas corpus was whether or not there was any
reasonable basis in the record that would support the Board of
9

Pardons' decision to rescind petitioner's parole date (R. at 101
p. 14; R. at 102, p.135).

The issue before this Court is whether

the trial court was correct in concluding that the record
supported the Board of Pardons' decision to rescind petitioner's
prospective parole release date.
As a general rule, the correction-of-error standard
applies to agency rulings on issues of law and extends no
deference to agency rulings. An agency's findings of fact,
however, are accorded substantial deference and will not be
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another
conclusion from the evidence is permissible.

As to questions of

mixed law and fact, a reviewing court usually accords

a

agency

decision some deference, i.e., an agency's decision will not be
set aside unless the agency's conclusion is unreasonable.

Hurley

v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah
1988).
The rationale behind the reasonableness standard is
that issues of mixed law and fact are often illuminated by an
agency's expertise. JEcL at 527. Further, an agency's special
technical knowledge may be of particular help in determining
whether the facts of a specific case are governed by a certain
rule or statute. JEd. Therefore, a reviewing court will give
some deference to an agency's decision, when that decision
involves an area of technical expertise or an area where the
legislature has specifically granted the agency discretion in its

10

decision-making process•

Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax

Comm. , 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (Utah 1991).
The legislature granted the Board of Pardons discretion
in its decision-making process in Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3)
(1985) which states:
The determinations and decisions of the Board
of Pardons in cases involving approval or
denial of any action, of paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence,
orders of restitution, or remission of fines,
forefeitures [sic], and restitution, are
final and are not subject to judicial
review.3
Because of the Board of Pardons' inherent expertise and its
decision-making power, the trial court correctly applied the
reasonableness standard.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that the Mtrial
court . . • found himself unable to determine with any kind of
specificity why [petitioner's] parole has been rescinded" (Br. of
App, at 24), the court issued detailed findings that support its
conclusions.

The trial judge reviewed the procedures of the

Board under a reasonableness standard and denied petitioner's
petition for writ of habeas corpus because the Board of Pardons
did not violate his constitutional rights (R. at 97-98).

The

trial judge was candid in explaining his role in making this
determination:

3

Although this statute states that Board of Pardons
decisions are not subject to judicial review, review of
procedural due process claims are not precluded. Hatch v.
DeLand, 790 P.2d 49, 50 (Utah App. 1990).
11

We're talking about some areas of the law
that are new, unique* And I'm confident that
regardless of what I do, this matter is going
to be reviewed by another court, and that's
fine. I have no — that's the way the system
works* But that doesn't mean that I want to
give it less consideration than I otherwise
might* And if it's going to be reviewed,
then for that reason alone it ought to have
my best efforts. . . . [T]he parties are
entitled to my best call on this* • . * I'm
certainly not going to substitute my judgment
for the Board of Pardons *
(R. at 102, p. 134-35).

It is evident from these comments, that

the trial court intended to conduct careful review of the facts
of this case and the law pertaining to this case before reaching
any conclusions*
At the September 26, 1990 hearing, the trial court
stated:
After careful analysis of this entire
record, and that includes all the prison
records that were received, the transcripts
of the various hearings that were had, all
the information that was submitted, I cannot
say that this record shows me that the Board
of Pardons have [sic] no evidence before it
that would not allow a conclusion that there
was new evidence, and that if there was a
release that there was not a potential risk
to the community. There is evidence to
suggest that the conclusion reached was not
arbitrary or caprecious [sic] or without any
foundation whatsoever.
I hasten to point out that the test is
not whether or not this court agrees with the
conclusion* That is not the standard.
Because I've already said, it's not my
prerogative to substitute my judgment for
that of the Board of Pardons* I'm only
reviewing this record to determine whether or
not there is any reasonable basis upon which
they could make a finding, and reach a
conclusion that if [petitioner] was released
on a parole date scheduled, that he could
12

present a serious risk, or danger to the
community. And so as I reviewed the record,
as I've indicated, I'm satisfied that there
is some evidence to support that conclusion
by the Board of Pardons.
(R. at 101, pp. 13-14) (Emphasis added).

Thus, after careful

review, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that
"there was new evidence received by the Board of Pardons which
justified the Board's decision to rescind [petitioner's] May 10,
1988 parole date" and that the "circumstances relating to
[petitioner] on May 9, 1988, constituted extraordinary
circumstances under Rule 3.10 which justified the rescission of
the parole date without providing prior notice to [petitioner]"
(R. at 97).
Based on the foregoing, this court should give some
deference to the trial judge's determination, rather than conduct
strict correctness review.
POINT III
PETITIONER HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE RELEASED ON PAROLE PRIOR TO THE
EXPIRATION OF HIS SENTENCE.
On July 30, 1980, petitioner was sentenced to two fiveto life sentences at the Utah State Prison (R. at 90). As
acknowledged by petitioner, the Utah Board of Pardons determines
the exact length of time the person actually serves (Br. of App.
at 13). In Kelly v. Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, 637 P.2d
858 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982), the
court stated:
Being given a parole docket date does not
mean that a prisoner is going to be placed on
13

parole; it means that a prisoner is going to
be considered for parole. There is a
possibility that parole may be granted; there
is also a possibility that parole may be
denied. . . . Since the petitioner has been
given no recognized liberty interest by
having a docket date set, he has not been
deprived of any constitutional right by
having that date changed.
Kelly, 637 P.2d at 858, 859.
The

Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals

follow the Oklahoma court's reasoning and have determined that
absent a state created right, an incarcerated person has no
inherent right to be released prior to the expiration of the
sentence.

Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984); Hatch v.

DeLandf 790 P.2d 49 (Utah App. 1990).

In Hatch, this Court

stated:
[AJbsent statutory language limiting a parole
board's discretion, "[t]here is no
constitutional or inherent right of a
convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence."
(citation omitted).
Id. at 51. No such statutory language exists in Utah.

Where no

substantial right exists, there can be no violation of that
right.
This issue was also addressed in White v. Utah State
Board of Pardons, 778 P.2d 20, 21 (Utah App. 1989).

White

involved a parole revocation hearing rather than a parole
recision hearing, however, the court's reasoning is helpful to
the present case.

The court stated:

" [Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the Board's actions violate a substantial
constitutional right.

This petition is clearly a request for
14

judicial review of a Board of Pardons decision and is precluded
by section 77-27-5(3)."

White, 778 P.2d at 21. This Court

further stated that our sentencing system vests almost complete
discretion in the Board of Pardons to determine the actual time
served.
In the present case, the trial court concluded as a
matter of law that "[t]he Courts should not interfere or review
particular Board of Pardons decisions lightly and should not
reverse or set aside such decisions unless the Board of Pardons
has clearly violated a constitutional right of the offender" (R.
at 95). Petitioner has not suffered a violation of a substantial
constitutional right because he has no right to be released on
parole prior to the expiration of his sentence.

Therefore, this

Court should affirm the decisions of the Board of Pardons and the
trial court.
POINT IV
THE BOARD OF PARDONS DID NOT VIOLATE ITS OWN
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND PETITIONER WAS
NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.
A.

The Board of Pardons' decision to
rescind petitioner's May 10, 1988 parole
date based on "new evidence" was
justified.

Petitioner argues that there was no new evidence before
the Board of Pardons that justified the rescission of his parole
date (Br. of App. at 18). Petitioner's claim is not supported by
the record.

15

At the July 27, 1990 hearing, the trial court invited
counsel for petitioner and defendants to submit briefs on the
meaning of "new evidence" (R. at 102, pp. 131-32).
were submitted.

No briefs

Therefore, the court defined "new evidence" as:

"negative information received by the Board of Pardons between
the time that a parole release date is set and the time that a
recision determination is made" (R. at 96).

In this case those

dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. Petitioner claims that
the "trial court also found himself unable to determine with any
kind of specificity why [petitioner's] parole had been rescinded
[and that] the trial court dismissed this problem by finding that
there was some evidence in the record which could have served as
a basis for the rescission" (Br, of App. at 24).

At the hearing

on September 26, 1990, the trial court specified the incidents
that constituted new evidence.
There was drug use early on after the
initial parole date was set. And there was
drug use when [petitioner] was in Duschene
County Jail recently, albeit it was minimal,
but it was still there. It's still a
violation of the law, and it was still
inappropriate conduct. And I think
[petitioner] knew that- There were problems
perhaps early on, but still new evidence
regarding discipline at the Utah State
Prison.
There is information in psychological
reports that were received after the initial
Board of Pardons' date was set, or after the
initial date was set for parole from the
Board of Pardons that was developed that
showed a number of things, antisocial
personality, lack of remorse, a number of
things.
And finally, there were a number of
problems with regard to the nature of the
release that [petitioner] sought, and the
16

type of parole that he was anticipating, and
whether or not that could be accomplished in
any fashion, and might still protect the
community . . . there is evidence in this
record as I've indicated that would support
the finding and conclusion of new evidence
that presents a substantial risk.
(R. at 101, p.14-15).
At the September 26, 1990 hearing and in appellant's
brief, petitioner asserts that incidents of drug use occurring
prior to 1984 cannot be considered "new.M

The trial court

addressed petitioner's assertion stating:

"Information was

received both before and after [the 1984 review date] that would
be enough in my judgment to support the conclusions reached by
the Board of Pardons when they did . . . it doesn't make any
difference because there's information both before and after
[1984]" (R. at 101, p. 17-18).
Because the record overwhelmingly supports the trial
court's conclusion that there was "new evidence" received by the
Board of Pardons which justified the Board's decision to rescind
petitioner's May 10, 1988 proposed parole date, this court should
affirm the trial court's ruling.
B,

The Board of Pardons' actions fell
within the exception to Rule 3.10.

Petitioner alleges that the Board of Pardons violated
its own policies and procedures in rescinding his May 10, 1988
parole release date (Br. of App. at 14). In May and July of
1988, the Utah Board of Pardons was operating under R655-310-1
and R655-310-2.

See Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and

Rules of this brief.
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On May 5, 1988, five days before petitioner's proposed
parole date, the Board of Pardons received new information in a
psychological evaluation (Def. Exh. #24 and included in this
brief as Addendum E).

The seven day notification deadline had

already passed and therefore, the extraordinary circumstances
exception to Rule 3,10 attached.

The recommendation portion of

the report reads:
It is this writer's recommendation that
[petitioner], if he is paroled, be placed in
a supportive environment such as family or
friends to make transition to society as
uneventful as possible. It is strongly
recommended that, in addition to any mental
health treatment, [petitioner] receive drug
abuse counseling.
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS
DETERMINATIONS, THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED
AS A FAVORABLE ONE.
(Def. Exh. #24, p.2, Addendum E) (emphasis added).

This section

of the report is just a recommendation and is not dispositive.
The Board is not bound by it.

The Board's concern over

petitioner's drug problem outweighed the positive recommendation
in this case (R. at 92). Specifically, the Board was concerned
with the fact that petitioner viewed his drug dependency as a
major factor in his anti-social behavior (R. at 92). The Board
was also concerned that petitioner admitted that he was high on
LSD at the time he committed his crime, and that he had used LSD,
cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana (R. at 91-92).

Finally, the

Board indicated that petitioner's major problem was his inability
to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal
substances (R. at 92).
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Given the date that the Board received petitioner's
first psychological evaluation, and given its concern regarding
petitioners drug use, extraordinary circumstances existed which
justified the rescission of petitioner's proposed parole
date.
POINT V
THE BOARD OF PARDONS' ACTIONS DID NOT
CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Petitioner asserts that the Board of Pardons' actions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Br. of App. at 28).
The recision of petitioner's May 10, 1988 proposed parole date
did not violate the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment under the federal constitution or petitioner's
state constitutional right under Article I § 9.
Relying on Penrv v. Lynauqh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989),
petitioner asserts that the Board of Pardons' actions fell short
of the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.

Petitioner fails, however, to recognize that

the United States Supreme Court carefully explained what it meant
by the "evolving standards" statement in Penrv.

"In discerning

those 'evolving standards,' we have looked to objective evidence
of how our society views a particular punishment today.

The

clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."
Penrv, 492 U.S. at 302 (citations omitted).
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Significantly, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202 (Supp. 1988)
gives the Board of Pardons the exclusive power to determine the
length of time an inmate actually serves.
Nothing in this section shall preclude the
board of pardons from the paroling or
discharging an inmate at any time within the
discretion of the board of pardons.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
Because the Board is authorized by statute to permit or deny
parole at any time, its actions did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
In his brief petitioner asks, in effect: What could be
more cruel than rescinding his prospective parole date the day
before it was to go into effect?

The facts of Solem v. Helm, 463

U.S. 277 (1983), answer petitioner's question.

In Solem, the

defendant was convicted of "uttering" a "no account" check for
$100.00.

Due to his prior record, he was subject to South

Dakota's recidivist statute which enhanced the felony to a class
one felony.

The maximum penalty for such a felony was life

imprisonment in the state penitentiary without possibility of
parole and a $125,000.00 fine.

The United States Supreme Court

held that under these facts the sentence was significantly
disproportionate to the crime and therefore violative of the
eighth amendment.

Solem, 463 U.S. at 303.

By contrast, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980),
petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from his state confinement
as he had received a life sentence under the Texas recidivist
statute and claimed it violated the eighth amendment as grossly
20

disproportionate to the crimes. He had been convicted of two
prior felonies for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain
$80.00 worth of goods and passing a forged check in the amount of
$28.36.

His third felony conviction was for obtaining $120.75 by

false pretenses.

He was sentenced to a life sentence.

The

United States Supreme Court held that "the mandatory life
sentence imposed upon this petitioner does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."

Petitioners conviction was affirmed.

In comparing petitioner's case with Solem and Rummel,
the Board of Pardon's action was appropriate given its concerns
about petitioner's drug use and the risk to society if he was
paroled.

It is important to note however, that at the same time

the Board affirmed the rescission of his parole date, it also
ordered a rehearing in May of 1990 (R. at 94). This added two
years to petitioner's sentence but also indicated that there was
still a possibility for parole.
The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values in Utah in 1988 was that the Board of Pardons
could rescind a scheduled parole or termination date at any time
prior to an inmates release without infringing upon any
constitutional right of an inmate.
P.2d 207, 208-209 (Utah App. 1988).

See State v. Alvillar, 748
Because the Board received

new evidence regarding petitioner's drug use and potential risk
to the community, it had good cause for rescinding his May 10,
1988 proposed parole date on May 9, 1990.
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Its action fell within

legislatively prescribed limits and simply fails to "shock the
moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper
under the circumstances."

st-.ate v. Russell, 791 P. 2d 188, 190

(Utah 1990) (setting forth the test for determining whether
punishment is cruel and unusual in specific applications).
The burden of showing that the Board of Pardon's action
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment is on petitioner.

He

has failed to demonstrate that the Board's action violated his
federal and state constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellees respectfully request
that this court affirm the trial court's order denying
petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and deny any
request to have his parole period reduced
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